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DUA SKIM PENGESAHAN E-VISA YANG BARU
BERASASKAN INFRASTRUKTUR KUNCI UMUM (PKI) DAN
ENKRIPSI BERASASKA IDENTITI (IBE)
ABSTRAK
Visa merupakan dokumen perjalanan yang sangat penting yang
membenarkan kita memasuki sesebuah negara yang akan kita lawati. Walau
bagaimanapun dokumen penting seperti visa ini masih ditangani secara
manual yang mana boleh memberi kesan kepada ketepatan dan kecekapan
dalam pemprosesan visa. Perlaksanaan e-visa masih belum meluas.
Penyelidikan ini memberikan gambaran yang terperinci tentang cadangan
baru prototaip sistem pengesahan e-visa berasaskan teknologi RFID.
Teknologi teras bagi sistem pengesahan e-visa yang dicadangkan itu adalah
berasaskan Enkripsi Berasaskan Identiti (IBE) dan Infrastruktur Kunci Umum
(PKI). Penyelidikan ini juga memberikan perbandingan antara kedua-dua
kaedah tersebut dari segi masa pemprosesan dan kebergunaan aplikasi.
Hasil penyaelidikan menunjukkan proses sistem pengesahan e-visa
mempamerkan kefleksibelan yang tinggi apabila dilaksanakan dengan IBE
tetapi menghasilkan kelajuan pemprosesan yang lebih baik apabila
dilaksanakan dengan PKI.
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TWO NOVEL E-VISAS VERIFICATION SCHEMES BASED ON
PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURE (PKI) AND IDENTITY BASED
ENCRYPTION (IBE)
ABSTRACT
Visa is a very important traveling document, which is an essential need at the
point of entry of any country we are visiting. However an important document
such as visa is still handled manually which affects the accuracy and
efficiency of processing the visa. Work on e-visa is almost unexplored. This
research provides a detailed description of a newly proposed e-visa
verification system prototyped based on RFID technology. The core
technology of the proposed e-visa verification system is based on Identity
Based Encryption (IBE) and Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). This research
provides comparison between both methods in terms of processing time and
application usability. The result shows the e-visa verification system process
has highly flexible when implemented with IBE and on the other hand
produces better processing speed when implemented with PKI.
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1CHAPTER ONE
RFID TECHNOLOGY FOR E-PASSPORTS AND E-VISAS
1.1 Introduction
In recent years, new electronic e-passports have started to replace
conventional paper-based passports around the world. In line with this
development, a new protocol for e-visas is proposed in this thesis that can
work hand in hand with current e-passport technology. The requirements for
this new type of e-visa include a higher level of security, i.e., a higher degree
of security inspection must be placed at inspection points at the entry points
of countries. The new e-visa reveals the owner’s identity and his/her criminal
records, if any, using Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology.
RFID is a generic term for technology that uses radio waves for
automatic identification of entities and individual coffers. RFID technology is
the next generation after bar codes in the area of identification technology.
The first use of RFID technology was implemented in the 1940s. The British
Air Force used RFID technology in World War II to identify whether airplanes
were belonged to them. RFID theory was initially introduced by Stockman in
1948 in a conference paper entitled “Communication by Means of Reflected
Power”. The first patent for RFID was filed by Charles Walton in 1973
(Stockman, 1948).
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21.2 The Background of E-visas
The proposed e-visa is relatively similar to the e-passport, in that it is
fitted with a microchip. The chip is embedded in the passport and contains
the holder’s digital photograph, name, gender, nationality, passport number,
expiration date, date of issue and place of issue. The same information is
also printed on the pages of every visa. In addition, the chip may hold
biometric data capable of verifying the identity of the visa holder.
This e-visa can be read very quickly and accurately by readers that
retrieve data for immigration systems at borders around the world and/or
track foreigners within a given country. The proposed e-visa is based on the
cryptography primitive known as Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) or Public-
Key Infrastructure (PKI), which can enhance the security of the e-visa itself
as well as the e-passport.
1.3 Motivation
E-visas are a very promising technology because of their wide range of
applications and the high level enforcement of security measures that can be
implemented through them. The present paper-based visa is very easy to
clone, especially when it takes the form of an ink stamp. However, e-visas
can hold more information on the holder, such as health and criminal records.
In addition, the e-visa is issued by the same country as the one that verifies
it, and therefore, it should be subject to minimal legal or privacy restrictions
because the country that issues the e-visa later uses (i.e., verifies) it.
E-visas can highly increase the security of the e-passport. In addition,
the implementation of e-visas could retain the use of a paper passport if
some countries have technology to detect an e–passport. The e-visa can be
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3read easily because the visa is issued by the same country that issues the e-
visa. Countries that wish to delay the implementation of e-passports and e-
visas can now easily wait until a time of their choosing without affecting the
countries that opt for e-visa implementation.
The proposed e-visa uses IBE or PKI, which contains a highly secured
mechanism; as such, this technology would pose no inconvenience to any of
the parties involved. Lastly, e-visas can also be deployed for other uses,
such as criminal detection systems and other related applications involving
border-crossings.
There is limited research on e-visas. Therefore, this study helps to
show that IBE and/or PKI provide a strong security system in which it is
politically safe to implement e-visas. Figure 1.1 shows the usage of e-
passports, given that countries may or may not agree on the usage the e-
passports, which in turn makes the idea of using e-passports less effective.
In contrast, Figure 1.2 shows 100% utilisation of the e-visa, assuming the
country issuing the e-visa uses the e-visa for its own purposes.
Figure 1.1: E-passport usage
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41.4 The Statement of Problem
A visa is a very important travel document, which is normally needed
during the inspection process at national borders. Travellers who wish to visit
other countries often need visas for entry into destination countries.
The proposed solution is for the embassy of the respective country to
issue an e-visa that can be read through the use of an electronic reader. At
the main entrance of a country, the e-visa is electronically read to ensure its
validity. Access to the data stored in an e-visa can occur at many stages and
in many different systems, including for instance, in hotels, through driving
licenses, during car rental, in malls and at police stations. Furthermore, the
implementation of e-visas speeds up the procedural travel constraints while
maintaining high security. Therefore, the implementation of e-visas that
integrate RFID with visas is strongly suggested.
Because the proposed e-visa is to be implemented in reality, the data
stored in the e-visa chip is subject to change or even being overwritten with
Figure 1.2: E-visa usage
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5fake data, which leads to the requirement of a verification system that can
validate the visa contents and judge the integrity of e-visa information.
1.5 Research Questions
This study seeks to address the following questions.
What are the problems and issues concerning RFID security
and privacy in e-passports that arise in the implementation of e-
visas?
What is an appropriate protocol for e-visa verification?
How can one verify e-visas using IBE and/or PKI?
1.6 Research Objectives
This research has the following objectives:
1. To review and compare the e-passport security standards based on
countries and regions and highlight the main security and privacy
contents to study the benefits of implementing e-visas.
2. To propose a secured implementation protocol of e-visa verification
using IBE and PKI.
3. To build a prototype e-visa verification system.
4. To compare IBE-based and PKI-based e-visa verification systems.
1.7 Research Scope
This research is limited only to e-visa verification systems as an
identification tool for travellers. In this research, a security management
solution for an e-visa verification system in addition to the existing passport
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6system is proposed through the use of IBE and PKI.
1.8 Research Contributions
The new contributions of this research include the following four points:
1. We first evaluate the current state-of-the-art technology. We begin this
research with a survey and review of the existing security mechanisms
for e-passports, which leads to a greater understanding of how e-
passports work and enables an analysis of the main security and
privacy concerns as well as the development of new approaches to
avoid problems in e-visa implementation.
2. We propose a secured implementation of e-visa verification using IBE
and PKI to achieve an optimal security level.
3. We show prototypes of the proposed system to demonstrate the
applicability of our proposed method.
4. We conduct a critical security discussion of the proposed e-visa
verification system.
1.9 Organisation of Thesis
This thesis is structured as follows (see Figure 1.3):
Chapter 1 presents a brief introduction to the concept of RFID as well
as e-visa and e-passport technologies. It also summarises the problem
statement, objectives, and research questions and presents a brief overview
of this thesis.
Chapter 2 presents relevant background information about e-visa and
e-passport technologies and security mechanisms, including articles and
reports from specialist departments regarding security and privacy threats. It
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7also provides more detailed descriptions of security mechanisms and
explains several mechanisms used in protecting the privacy and security of
e-passports as well as a brief overview of IBE, which is a security mechanism
that is proposed for e-visa implementation.
Chapter 3 explains the research procedure and the suitable methods
that we could use to verify the e-visa; it also clarifies the theoretical
framework and research design.
Chapter 4 presents a security analysis of the new protocol.
 Chapter 5 presents the conclusions of this thesis and provides further
recommendations for future work.
Figure 1.3: Flow of research activates
Problem statement
&
Objectives
Literature survey
Methodology
Propose protocol
&
Analysis
Recommendation
for future work
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8CHAPTER TWO
REVIEW OF THE E-PASSPORT AND E-VISA SECURITY
MECHANISMS
2.1 Introduction
Due to the increasing number of security issues with paper-based
passports, their use is slowly but surely fading into oblivion. Despite their
increasing shortcomings, paper passports have yet to be phased out as they
are still needed for identification and other processing tasks. There is
however an increasing need for a new form of electronic travelling document,
or e-passport and e-visa, to eventually replace the common paper passports.
In general, there arises a serious issue with the usage of e-passports
because capable devices are not found in many countries to read the e-
passports. Therefore, this research would strive to create a new protocol for
e-visa to eventually replace the common paper visas. New implementation of
e-visa will be readable around the world and will probably have several other
uses, for example, for hotels and car rentals. In order to implement a new
suitable technology satisfying the e-visa requirements, the combined use of
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) and biometric identification
technologies together in the electronic document (e-passport) would be
extremely helpful to produce e-visa sufficiently to serve in the new era of
global identification. In this chapter, e-passports will be briefly explained,
along with their technology standards, and main privacy and security threats.
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9Furthermore, a brief overview of e-visa system, Identity Based
Encryption (IBE) and Public Key Infrastructures (PKI) will be given in line with
the proposal in this thesis to implement e-visa verification system.
2.2 Machine Readable Travel Document (MRTD)
A Machine Readable Travel Document (Gaurav and Paul , 2005) is
defined as an official document that is issued by an official party (country or
equivalent) which is used by the holder as an identity document for
international travel purposes (e.g. passport, visa), containing the mandatory
visual (eye readable) data, and a separate mandatory machine-readable
electronic data summary. The common international standards for the new
passports were set by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in
2001 and have been adopted by the waiver countries and the United States
of America. (Vaudenay and Vuagnoux, 2007).
The main goals in these standards were to increase the ease of task
processing and decrease the duration of tasks, while maintaining a high level
of security and accuracy. All the required data would be stored on a RFID
microchip that can be accessed from a short distance using radio waves.
2.2.1 E-passport Architecture
In the near future, the use of an e-passport does not spell the abolition
of the standard paper-based passport, which will remain necessary until the
new technology is used globally. In the meantime, the e-passport would be
designed to work in tandem with the paper-based passport, while the paper-
based passport can still be used in the absence of the new technology in
certain countries. Eventually the use of the paper-based passport will
hopefully be phased out when the new technology is used by the whole world
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concurrently. Currently, the e-passport makes use of a small contact-less
integrated circuit that can be embedded in the back cover of the passport.
This chip stores all the data required by immigration departments subject to
international standards within an international passport. An additional feature
is a digital profile photograph, which could eventually be developed into a 3D
image complete with an iris scan, a voice scan, fingerprints, or, when
biometric science has developed sufficiently, a DNA pattern, in order to
enable high technology biometric comparisons, e.g. through the use of facial
recognition technology, at international borders. All these accurate and hard
to duplicate features can be stored via RFID, which enables the information
to be stored securely in the form of digital information as shown in Figure 2.1.
The ICAO has defined a common standard structure.
A standardized Logical Data Structure (LDS) is required to enable
global interoperability. The LDS identifies all mandatory and optional data
elements and any prescriptive ordering and/or grouping of data elements that
must be followed to achieve global interoperability for the reading of details
(Data Elements) recorded in a capacity expansion technology (IC Chip).
This structure categorizes the information into mandatory, optional and future
information:
1. Mandatory: the information that is also physically present on the
passport. At present, face recognition is specified as the only
mandatory globally interoperable biometric for the identity verification
of travelers.
2. Optional: fingerprint and iris biometric data.
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According to (Lekkas and Gritzalis, 2007a,2007b), the structure of the data is
stored in the passport’s chip (the LDS – Logical Data Structure), including the
digital signature. Data are separated into two parts:
(a) the user files, in a writable area (Dedicated Files – DF), and
(b) the LDS, providing read-only access.
Sixteen Data Groups, containing the holder’s identification and
biometric data. According to (Avoine et al., 2008, Kugler) the MRZ (including
document number, name of bearer, nationality, date of birth, etc.) is stored in
the 1st Data Group, the biometric data, such as facial image and fingerprint
and iris scans, are stored respectively in Data Groups 2, 3 and 4. Data
Groups 5, Data Groups 6 and Data Groups 7 display identification features.
Encoded security features are stored in Data Groups 8, Data Groups 9 and
Data Groups 10. The Active Authentication public key is stored in the 15th
Data Group. Thus, the public key provides an unambiguous connection
Figure 2.1: How e-passports are processed
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between the whole signed data set and the chip. Similarly, the serial number
of the chip may be stored in the LDS Data Group 13, thus providing secure
logical and physical binding (but this is optional). The hash values of all the
present Data Groups form a new structure, called the LDS Security Object.
This is signed, according to the ‘Cryptographic Message Syntax’, thus
producing the Document Security Object ( SOD), which is stored in the chip
(see Figure 2.2).
2.2.2 Biometrics Data
Biometrics data refer to the verification of human identity through the
biological characteristics of a person. This biometric authentication is unique
Figure 2.2: Logical Data Structuer cited (MRTD
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in its ability to differentiate one person from another, and can be very reliable
and secure. Many biological features can be used to identify an individual,
and the biometric verification systems favored and deployed in e-passports
focus on the use of fingerprints, face recognition and irises. The use of
fingerprints in e-passports is essentially different from the fingerprint
matching system used in criminal investigations (Kosta et al., 2007).
With e-passports, it relies on on-line imaging and is an automated
process where fingerprint scanners, such as optical or silicon sensors, would
scan an image from the target’s fingers and search for a match with the pre-
loaded image in the embedded chip in the e-passport. It is rather difficult for
the naked eye to recognize a face from a passport picture if the picture is not
very recent.
Face recognition involves the photographic imaging of a person’s face
and searching for a match with the available data in the chip. Another
biological feature recognition system is iris recognition, which also uses
imaging. The colored annular portion of the eye around the pupil, which is
known as the iris, is scanned non-invasively by the biometric systems via a
high precision camera, and the image is mapped onto the available data to
ascertain the identity of the target individual.
According to (Juels et al., 2005), the processing of biometric data
involves a number of critical matters. One of the issues here is whether the
person's data have been authenticated. Assuming they have been
authenticated, the individual could register the data by setting an initial, high-
quality biometric image to the sensor system, which would store the
information extracted during the registration process into a data structure
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known as a template. This template could then be used as a reference point
for the user in future matching processes. Here, the verifying entity compares
the biometric information obtained in an on-line manner for authentication
with the archived data stored in the template for the user. This ‘matching’
process is highly valid, in that the template and the authentication image
should match effectively. This match is achieved if they are sufficiently similar
according to a pre-determined and often complicated and vendor-specified–
metric that is acceptable under the law of respective countries.
In order for the verifying entity to be certain that the image is not a
prosthetic but a digital one, most manufacturers of biometric sensors try to
design them with the ability to resist spoofing via prosthetics, and to employ
data security techniques that are supported by trained live-ware to
authenticate that the origin of the biometric information is from a trusted
sensor. In other words, the privacy of templates is critically important and
must be comprehensively guaranteed within the baseline ICAO standards.
2.3 Security and Privacy Issue
The following states an example of a security issue regarding e-
passport. When an immigration officer swipes a passport via a reader, the
passport’s key codes are fed to allow a microchip reader to communicate
with the RFID chip. The data contained in this chip, which include the holders
picture, is then displayed on the officials screen.
The usual assumption at this stage is that this document is authentic,
as it is extremely secure. However, one of the main obstacles in RFID
deployment in e-passports are security attacks, which may threaten to
manipulate the RFID technology. As it is, privacy and security issues differ
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based on the existing mechanisms; hence, the basic threats and attacks
need to be explained.
2.3.1 Security Threats
Several researchers have discussed general security threats and
privacy issues on the topic of possessing and using e-passports. They have
discussed the threats and then evaluated the risks and proposed e-passport
types based on them. The focus here is the ICAO standards and the specific
deployment choices of some of the nations that have started using the new
technology.
· Scanning: RFID tags are subject to concealed scanning. The
fundamental ICAO fundamental does not require encrypted or
authenticated communication between the passports' tags and
readers. As a result, an insecure e-passport chip is subject to short-
range (up to a few feet) concealed scanning, which poses the risk of
exposing the sensitive personal information of an individual, such as
name, place and date of birth, to anyone in possession of a suitable
reader (Juels, 2006) . 
· Tracking: RFID chips require the production (without authentication)
of a chip ID on protocol initiation; this could enable –especially if this
ID is different for every passport—the tracking of the passport holders
movements by unauthorized parties. Tracking does not require the
data on the chip to be read (Meingast et al., 2007a,2007b).
· Skimming and cloning: According Hoepman et al.(2006), Rotter,
(2008), Pooters (2008), the data stored in the chip could be read by an
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illegitimate reader raising the risk of copying and using data on other
chips. As a result, more than one user could be using the same data.
· Unauthorized tag reading: It is possible to build a more powerful
reader to eavesdrop and steal information from the original RFID tag.
Vaudenay (2007) mentioned that it is relatively cheap to build an
extended range reader; and these fake readers could be used by
attackers to extend a reading-range by several times that of the
standard communication distance to read tag information.
· Eavesdropping: While the RFID tag is being accessed by a
legitimate reader, there is a high opportunity of intercepting and
capturing the information on the chip. Three major reasons make
eavesdropping possible:
· Feasibility: It may be feasible from a longer distance, given that
eavesdropping is a passive operation.
· Detection difficulty: As it is purely passive and does not involve
powered signal emission, it is difficult to detect.
· Function stealth: Eavesdropping is possible in a variety of
circumstances since future applications of e-passports will not
only be in airports, but also in new areas like e-commerce
(Juels et al., 2005, Hancke, 2005). The threat model consists of
a hardware architecture comprising two parts:
i. The front-end is an RF eavesdropper that can
continuously read and record RF-based communication
at public places with a high density of e-passports, e.g.,
near inspection systems at airports. Optionally, a
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surveillance camera may snap pictures of the particular
passport holder.
ii. The back-end is a cryptanalytic system that is
connected to databases as well as to hardware or
software modules for the fast cryptanalysis of symmetric
ciphers (Carluccio et al., 2007) (see Figure 2.3).
· Replay attacks: Attackers can use a clone of a legitimate tag or
resend the eavesdropped signal from a PC equipped with an
appropriate card and antenna. By doing this, the attackers may hack
into authorized tag carriers’ identities by repeating their authentication
sequences (Hancke, 2005, Hlavac and Rosa, 2007).
· Identity theft: In some tags, information stored on a transponder,
including personally identifiable information such as a name or credit
Figure 2.3: Threat model (Carluccio et al., 2007)
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card number might be decrypted; this personal information could then
be stolen and used by an unauthorized entity.
· Biometric data leakage: Biometric data stored on e-passports are
open to its own security risks. When biometric data, especially facial
images, become more popular as standards, it becomes necessary to
secure this data so it will not be easy to obtain a person’s official
biometric identity, particularly if it becomes a standard biometric
outside the passport context (Uludag et al., 2004).
· Physical Attacks: According to Longva (2005), physical attacks
involve tags attacked physically in order to gain information stored on
the tag. Such physical attacks may include distorting the power supply
from the tag, disrupting the circuit, using a laser or an electron beam
to read from or write to the tag etc.
2.3.2 Security mechanism
In general, three cryptographic measures are specified to be
implemented in e-passports (Vaudenay and Vuagnoux, 2007,
Pasupathinathan et al., 2008): Passive Authentication (PA), Basic Access
Control (BAC) and Active Authentication (AA). In addition, Extended Access
Control (EAC) is the fourth measure currently proposed to be a solution in the
next generation of e-passports (Trojani, 2007). The following is the strength
and weakness analysis of the existing mechanism which is summarized in a
comparison Table 2.1:
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Table 2.1: Strengths and weaknesses of existing mechanisms
2.4 Overview of the E-visa System
So far, there has not been much research in the area of e-visas.
Based on the literature, the research on e-visas has been conducted mainly
by two researchers, Uzun and Diri (Uzun and Diri, 2005) and the Electronia
company. This current research is focused on creating an e-visa method that
can strengthen the development of an e-visa system. In the e-visa system,
the traditional document visa is replaced by an electronic visa, which is a chip
embedded in the passport that contains personal information and digital
biometric data on the e-visa holder. When a traveller comes to the
Mechanism Strength Weakness
Passive
authentication
§ Verify the
authenticity and
integrity of e-
passports' Logical
Data Structures .
(Vijayakrishnan et
al., 2008).
§ Does not prevent the exact
copying of the chip content or chip
substitution.
§ Does not prevent skimming and
eavesdropping.
Active
authentication
§ Prevents chip
duplication or
cloning.
§ Cannot prevent illegal reader that
reads the electronic data being
read; this means that skimming
could happen here.
§ Eavesdropping for unencrypted
data is possible.
§ Does not verify the authenticity
and integrity of e-passport LDS.
Basic Access
Control
§ Prevents skimming
and eavesdropping.
§ Does not verify the authenticity
and integrity of e-passport LDS.
§ Does not prevent the exact
copying of the chip content or chip
substitution.
§ Low key entropy could lead to
skimming.
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immigration area of an airport, he/she has to insert his/her passport into a
reader and place himself/herself in a biometric reading device for
identification.
After being confirmed as the correct person, personal information is
sent to a central computer server for further verification regarding, e.g.,
whether the person is on a criminal wanted list or whether the person has
any tax liabilities to the government. After this information is validated, the
central computer will send a signal to open the gate and let the passenger
pass through; otherwise, a signal will be sent to an alarm to alert the security
officer. Figure 2.4 below shows a general overview of the e-visa system.
2.4.1 E-visa Design
E-visa is used to identify whether the holder is the correct owner of the
visa and has approved access to the country. In addition, the e-visa is
considered as contactless technology which allows increasing the speed of
data transfer up to 424Kb per second. The e-visa can be implemented either
Figure 2.4: General overview of the
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as a smart label of size 50mm x 50mm to be attached to the passport or
issued in an ISO ID1 card (Electronia, 2008).
2.4.1.1 Data Store Technology
The requirements and existing infrastructure of each country help in
determining the techniques used to transport data. RFID tag and barcode
techniques are used to transport information. However, there are important
differences between these two technologies which are shown on the
following adapted Table 2.2 below from (Finkenzeller, 2003). The table
compares them in terms of the level of security, machine readability, cost,
reading speed, maximum distance between data carrier and read rate and
others.
System
Parameter
Barcode RFID
Typical Data
Quantity(bytes)
1-100 16-64
Data Density Low Low
Machine Read Ability Good Good
Readability by People Limited Impossible
Influence of Damp/Dirt very high No influence
Influence of(opt) covering Total failure No influence
Degradation/ wear Limited No influence
Purchase cost/reading
electronics
Very low Medium
Operating cost Low None
Unauthorized
copying/modification
Slight Impossible
Reading Speed Low 4 s Very fast 0.5 s
Maximum Distance
Between Data carrier&
Read
0-50 cm 0-5 m
Security Low. Much easier to
reproduce or counterfeit
High. Difficult to
replicate. Data can
be encrypted;
password
protected, or
includes a "kill"
Table 2.2: Comparison between barcode and RFID
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feature to remove
data permanently,
so information
stored is much
more secure.
Read Rate Very low throughput.
Tags can only be read
manually, one at a time.
High throughput.
Multiple (>100) tags
can be read
simultaneously.
However contactless chip card technology is seemed to be the optimal
solution for providing information of travelers in a reliable method. Physically,
there will be some general information used for general inspection purposes
only. This information about the visa holder is printed on the surface of the
visa, such as photo, name, sex, nationality, date of issue, expiry date,
handwriting, signature, etc. On the card, the IC chip stores more details and
confidential information. Logically, it is structured in three different layers.
Each layer encapsulates and protects more sensitive data that is contained in
the deeper layer. A few researches that had been conducted in area of e-visa
but only one proposed e-visa structure which is by Uzun and Diri (2005).
Figure 2.5 shows the structure of the three layers which was proposed and
the logical view of the data stored in the chip. In the later section, the
mentioned layers will be discussed individually.
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The first layer is General Personal Information. This layer contains
general information about the passport holder. This area provides a point to
provide information access to be used in a country’s civilization area. The
second layer is acts as the access control lists / visas. Forms of the visas will
be digitalized and stored in this layer. Different visas issued by different
countries are stored in sequential records to allow more than one visa at a
time. The information stored in each record includes the country code, visa
type of class code, issue date, expiry date, terms and conditions, etc.
Moreover, each visa should be encrypted independently by the issuer except
for the country code.
Layer 2 –Access Control List
Nam
Date of birth
VisaVisa
Visa
Visa
Visa
Visa
Visa
Visa
Visa
Visa
Country Code
Layer 3 –Biometric Information
Layer 1 –General Personal
Information
Figure 2.5: E-visa smart card structure (adapted from S. Uzun and B. Diri (2005))
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The third layer is biometric ID information. Incorporation of biometrics
will provide a secure and strong authentication for the travelers because this
layer should be highly secured as it is used for holder identification. The
biometrics systems can be given as examples of deployment in e-visa
techniques as voice, fingerprint, and iris recognition. Precisely, the data
stored here should be encrypted and read only by authenticated readers.
2.4.1.2 Security Module
There are three different cryptographic secure logical modules which
are used to access different layers of the card. The first security module is
General Purpose Readings which is used to perform readings on the first
layer of the card which contains only general information about the card
holder. The second security module is visa approval which is used to read
the second layer which contains records of the visas. It should verify whether
the card owner carries a valid visa for the respective country.
The third security module is biometric matching and biometric reader.
Biometric matching module should be closely designed and identification
matching should be completed within the module in order to enable the
highest security. For biometric reading technically, it should be constructed
with a high reliability, and it should be closely connected with the smart card
reader to ensure the biometric data is transferred under a secured channel.
In addition to the gate module is the electronic gate.
It is controlled by the central computer which opens or closes upon
receiving a signal. The connection between the gate and the computer
should be protected in order to avoid wire tapping or interference.
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